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I. INTRODUCTION
Water quality problems continue to plague our nation, even
though Congress passed the Clean Water Act (CWA) to "restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters"1 more than three decades ago. During the past
thirty years, the dominant sources of water pollution have changed,
requiring us to seek new approaches for cleaning up our waters.
Water quality trading has been heralded as an approach that can
integrate market mechanisms into the effort of cleaning up our
water. This Article examines the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) policy on water quality trading and the prospects
for water quality trading to help improve water quality.
Part II briefly describes our water quality problems and causes.
Part III examines the theoretical basis for trading and the EPA's
Water Quality Trading Policy. Part IV discusses the potential im-
pact of total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) on water quality trad-
ing, and Part V analyzes potential problems that water quality
trading programs confront. Part VI addresses distributional and ef-
ficiency concerns that arise when considering trading and agricul-
tural nonpoint source pollution. Part VII then examines issues
relating to water quality trading and state laws before reaching con-
clusions and recommendations in Part VIII.
II. THE PROBLEM OF NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION
After initial passage of the CWA in 1972,2 attention was fo-
cused on point sources of pollution.3 Point sources (PSs) are usu-
ally associated with a pipe that discharges wastewater into streams,
lakes, or rivers.4 The National Pollutant Elimination Discharge Sys-
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2001 and Supp. 2003) (stating statute's objectives).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). This law, formally known as the Water Pol-
lution Prevention and Control Act, amended previous water pollution control laws.
3. Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail: Structuring
a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WASH. U.J.L. &
Pol'y 21 (2002) (shifting focus to point sources).
4. Martin T. Schultz & Mitchell J. Small, Integrating Performance in the Design of
a Water Pollution Trading Program, in IMPROVING REGULATION: CASES IN ENVIRON-
MENT, HEALTH, AND SAFETY 380 (Paul S. Fischbeck & R. Scott Farrow eds., 2001). A
point source is defined as:
any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not lim-
ited to any pipe, ditch, channel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container,
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other
floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term
does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irri-
gated agriculture.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2001 and Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).
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tern (NPDES), which regulates the granting of permits under the
CWA,5 represents this focus on PSs.6 As significant water quality
improvements resulted from the NPDES program and PS pollution
reductions, it became clear that non-point source 7 (NPS) pollution
contributes greatly to remaining water quality problems. It eventu-
ally became evident that PS reductions alone would not suffice to
clean up waterways8 and that the challenges presented by NPSs
needed to be addressed. 9
This Article primarily focuses on agricultural NPS pollution
since it comprises the largest source of NPS pollution.'0 Phosphor-
ous and nitrogen loading are the most serious NPS problems in
agriculture." The large "dead zone" in the Gulf of Mexico result-
This definitional exemption for agricultural pollution, which otherwise would be
considered point source pollution, first appeared as part of the 1977 amendments
to the CWA, at which time the term "point source" was changed to read: "[t]his
term does not include return flows from irrigated agriculture." See Drew L. Ker-
shen, Agricultural Water Pollution: From Point to Nonpoint and Beyond, 9 WATER NAT.
REs. & ENV'T 3, 3-4 (1995) (describing history of PS's definition). This was subse-
quently changed to the current definition as part of amendments in 1987. See id.
at 4.
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000) (discussing NPDES).
6. OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL WATER QUALITY TRAD-
ING POLICY, available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/finalpolicy
2003.html [hereinafter EPA TRADING POLICY] (describing NPDES as critical in PS
reduction).
7. Schultz & Small, supra note 4, at 380. Non-point sources are diffuse sources
of pollution and include such things as agricultural fields, highways, and urban
areas. See id.
8. See EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6 (describing current water pollution
problems). "Approximately 40% of the rivers, 45% of the streams and 50% of the
lakes that have been assessed still do not support their designated uses." Id. (foot-
note omitted).
9. Trading Water Pollution Reduction Credits: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water
Resources and Environment of the Comm. on House Transportation and Infrastructure,
109th Cong. (2002) (statement of Benjamin H. Grumbles, Deputy Assistant Ad-
ministrator for Water, United States EPA), available at 2002 WL 20318104 (stating
NPS problems must be addressed).
10. See Suzie Greenhalgh & Amanda Sauer, World Resources Institute, Awak-
ening the Dead Zone: An Investment for Agriculture, Water Quality, and Climate
Change 3-4 (2003), at http://water.wri.org/pubs-description.cfm?PubID=3803
(noting that NPS pollution contributes as much as ninety percent of nitrogen flow-
ing into Gulf of Mexico). While agriculture is the most difficult and variable NPS,
urban runoff also presents problems, and the EPA recommends modeling or ac-
tual monitoring. EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at I. However, more and
more urban runoff is now being channeled into the NPDES permit process. See
generally 40 C.F.R. § 122.26 (2002).
11. See PAUL FAETH, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, FERTILE GROUND: NUTRIENT
TRADING'S POTENTIAL To COST EFFECTwELY IMPROVE WATER QUALITY 1, 6-7 (2000)
[hereinafter FERTILE GROUND], available at http://pdf.wri.org/fertile-ground.pdf
(noting agriculture's accounting for 82% of nitrogen discharges and 84% of phos-
phorous discharges).
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ing from nutrient pollution flowing from the Mississippi River testi-
fies to the gravity of the problem of nutrient pollution. 12 For many
years, virtually all agricultural NPS pollution was free from regula-
tion. 13 While federal laws have begun to exercise jurisdiction over a
few sources of agricultural NPS pollution, agriculture's relative im-
munity to regulation has pushed agricultural NPS pollution to the
forefront of water pollution policy.14
III. WATER QUALITY TRADING: THEORY AND POLICY
A. The Theory Behind Trading
The idea of using market incentives in water quality trading
has been discussed in the environmental field for almost four de-
cades. 15 The Clean Air Act utilizes trading and has spawned consid-
erable writing on the topic. 16 Interest in trading led the EPA to
release a draft of proposed trading rules for water quality in 1996.17
In January of 2003, EPA released its final policy on water quality
trading programs. 18
The theoretical justification for water quality trading is both
simple and compelling: allow the various parties that contribute
pollution to a water body, using their particular and specialized
12. SeeJAMRo ESCOBAR, UNITED NATIONS, LA CONTAMINACI6N DE LOS Rios Y sus
EFECTOS EN LAS AREAS COSTERAS Y EL MAR [THE CONTAMINATION OF RIVERS AND ITS
EFFECTS ON COASTAL AREAS AND THE SEA] 10 (2002) (using outflow of Mississippi
River as one of most extreme examples of land-based pollution of rivers adversely
affecting oceans). See also DONALD A. GOOLSBY ET AL., FLUX AND SOURCES OF NUTRI-
ENTS IN THE MISSiSSIPPI-ATCHAFALAYA RIVER BASIN 14 (1999).
13. SeeJ.B. Ruhl, The Environmental Law of Farms: 30 Years of Making a Mole Hill
Out of a Mountain, 31 ENVrL. L. REp. 10203 (2001), WL 31 ELR 10203, *1 [herein-
after Environmental Law of Farms] (discussing agriculture's virtual immunity from
environmental legislation).
14. See id. at *7-9 (describing regulatory attempts to reduce NPSs). Those
states that have tried to regulate NPSs have not implemented them for agriculture.
Id. at *9.
15. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, Sci-
ENCE, AND POLICY 165 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining history of economic incentive
approaches).
16. OFFICE OF POLICY, ECONOMICS, AND INNOVATION, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR EN-
VIRONMENT (Jan. 2001), available at http://yosemitel.epa.gov/ee/epa/eermfile.
nsf/vwAN/EE-0216B-1 3.pdf/$File/EE-0216B-13.pdf [hereinafter U.S. EXPERIENCE]
(stating "EPA is well known for its use of emissions trading as a key feature of its
program to control acid rain.").
17. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 1996 EFFLUENT TRADING IN WATER-
SHED: POLICY STATEMENT (1996), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/water-
shed/trading/tradetbl.html (explaining EPA's policy concerning trading in
watersheds).
18. See EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6 (stating EPA's final policy on Water
Quality Trading).
[Vol. XV: p. 1
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knowledge of their activities, to remedy the problem themselves by
using a market approach that encourages the party with the lowest
pollution abatement costs to reduce its pollution loading. A suc-
cessful trading program's degree of cost saving depends on parties
with great differences in costs for pollution reductions. 19 Users
with a high cost to reduce their pollution loading can simply pay
those with a lower cost of abatement to do additional abatement in
place of those with high costs.
Economic theory suggests that trades will occur until the mar-
ginal cost for pollution reductions is the same for all pollution
sources in a watershed.20 If this occurs, then the most cost efficient
way of reducing pollution has been found. Trading contrasts with
the "command-and-control" approach to regulation in which a bu-
reaucratic structure assigns certain technologies, methods, or limi-
tations to polluting parties with minimal consideration of the
differences in the marginal cost of reductions by different parties.
In addition to achieving least-cost pollution reductions, trading
"capitalizes on economies of scale and the control cost differentials
among and between sources," and increases the self-determination
of the parties involved.2i The market-based approach of trading
can "create economic incentives for innovation, emerging technol-
ogy, voluntary pollution reductions, and greater efficiency in im-
proving the quality of the nation's waters." 22 The possible virtues of
trading spawned rave reviews and great excitement accompanying
the unveiling of the EPA's water quality trading policy.2 3 While
some already sing the praises of water quality trading as a way of
19. See, e.g., U.S. ENVrL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA REGION 10 - IDAHO - LOWER
BOISE EFFLUENT TRADING DEMONSTRATION PROJECT, at http://www.epa.gov/owow/
watershed/tradelinks.html. Assessment of cost differentials for reductions must
take into account not only the possible costs of NPS reductions but also the nature
of the PSs involved. See FERTILE GROUND, supra note 11, at 32-37. This requires
careful analysis of each individual watershed's situation as the cost of reductions in
watersheds can vary tremendously. For example, one must consider factors such as
the size of point source dischargers like municipal treatment plants in the water-
shed since phosphorous removal by some methods becomes much more economi-
cal per gallon of water treated as the size of the plant increases. Id. at 25-26.
20. See Schultz & Small, supra note 4, at 384. Attainment of equality of margi-
nal costs among polluters assumes that transaction costs do not exist. Cf. R.H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). See also EPA TRADING
POLICY, supra note 6 (describing water trading program's efficiency).
21. See EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6 at I (stating benefits of trading).
22. See id. (stating trading's other possible benefits). The EPA estimated that
"flexible approaches to improving water quality could save $900 million [] annu-
ally compared to the least flexible approach." Id.
23. See, e.g., Editorial, Pint for Pint, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2003, at Al1. See also
Editorial, The Color of Water, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2003, at A18.
2004]
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improving the quality of our waters with less money expended, 24
others are far more reserved in their assessment.25
B. EPA Policy
EPA policy on water quality trading contains elements to con-
sider when designing a water quality trading program. 26 The EPA
emphasizes that all decisions on potential trading programs should
be determined on a case-by-case basis, and that all trading programs
must comply with the CWA. 27 EPA also notes that trading must oc-
cur within clearly circumscribed boundaries of watersheds or a
TMDL area, as this helps ensure that water quality improvements
will appear.28 Furthermore, EPA states that trading programs
should focus primarily on nutrient (i.e., phosphorous and nitro-
gen) pollution and sediment loading. 29
The EPA encourages a system in which tradable credits may be
created only when reductions exceed reductions required by regu-
latory authority or by a TMDL.30 Other considerations required to
24. See, e.g., David W. Riggs, Market Incentives for Water Quality, in THE MARKET
MEETS THE ENVIRONMENT 167 (ed. Bruce Yandle, 1999). See also EPA TRADING PO-
icy, supra note 6 (describing benefits of trading as greater flexibility, greater envi-
ronmental benefits than those achieved under old law, and decreased cost).
25. See, e.g., Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on Long Island Sound: Is
There a Place for Pollutant Trading?, 23 CoLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 137, 196, 214-15 (1998)
(noting more money may be necessary to clean up water).
26. EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at III (listing considerations for water
quality trading program design).
27. Id. at I, III.A (noting EPA's case-by-case approach and requirement of
compliance with CWA).
28. Id. at III B. Interstate watersheds present a difficult scenario as the water
quality standards for different states within the same watershed may vary. This
could lead to trading programs with different goals and standards. In such a case,
"EPA can require . .. that uniform WQS [water quality standards] apply to inter-
state waters." Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from
the Clean Air Act, 23 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 203, 254 (1999) [hereinafter Lessons from
the Clean Air Act]. One example of this is the Great Lakes Water Quality Initiative.
See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1268(c) (2) (2000).
29. EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at III.C. Other forms of trading may
be approved but would receive greater scrutiny. Id. Currently, EPA does not sup-
port trading of persistent bioaccumaltive toxics (PBTs) but might consider them in
the future depending on results of research and possible pilot programs. Id.
While it is very difficult to quantify the amount of nutrients coming off of farm-
land, it is also true that reducing NPS pollution in a PS-NPS trade "can also have
the additional advantage of decreasing sediment loads." See FERTILE GROUND,
supra note 11, at 3. The importance of the additional reduction of sedimentation
is tremendous since siltation is the primary cause of water quality problems in 51%
of the impaired rivers in the U.S. See id. at 7.
30. EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at III.D (noting that any PS or NPS
would have to reduce beyond any waste load or load allocation for that source).
Trading would not be allowed as a way to comply with existing technology-based
effluent limitations except as expressly authorized by federal regulations. See id. at
[Vol. XV: p. I
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ensure compliance with the CWA include use of standard existing
methodologies for measuring PS pollution,31 compliance with anti-
backsliding and anti-degradation provisions,32 clearly defined units
of trade, 33 public participation and access to information, 34 mecha-
nisms for enforcement, 35 and legally-recognized methods to calcu-
late pollution reductions of NPSs that give rise to credits. 3 6
Programs should also include publicly available, periodic evalua-
tions of trading programs.37 Such evaluations should consider ac-
tual removal efficiencies, water quality changes or improvements,
and the economics of the trading, including the price of credits per
unit and the transaction and administrative costs of the program.38
Another prerequisite noted by EPA for engaging in a trading
program consists of determining baselines for the creation of cred-
its. 39 EPA's policy states that in the absence of a TMDL, baselines
should be established by "the level of pollutant load associated with
existing land uses and management practices that comply with ap-
plicable state, local, or tribal regulation."40 The issue of baselines
implicates the efficiency and distributive concerns, which are the
focus of Part VI of the Article. Before considering such concerns,
however, this Article will examine how baselines also relate to an-
other program involving calculations of pollution loading: TMDLs.
III.E.4. However, EPA did say that it would consider adding provisions for trading
in future laws regarding technology-based effluent limits. See id. See also U.S. EXPE-
RIENCE, supra note 16, at 106 ("Of concern is the CWA requirement that existing,
expanding, and new facilities-including publicly owned treatment works, indus-
trial dischargers, stormwater programs, and coastal zone measures-meet all appli-
cable technology-based requirements. This requirement appears to represent a
severe obstacle to trading.").
31. See, e.g., EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at III.F (explaining necessary
conditions to meet CWA's requirements).
32. Id. at III.F (noting how compliance is achieved).
33. Id. at 11I.G.2. When an NPDES permit is involved with the trade, the units
should reflect those of the NPDES permit. Id.
34. Id. at III.G.6 (helping to strengthen effectiveness by increasing public
awareness).
35. Id. at 11I.G.1. These might include legislation, rulemaking, or private con-
tracts. See id.
36. EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at III.F.4. The methods for calculating
NPS reductions should include a way to account for the greater uncertainty associ-
ated with NPS pollution. See also id. at III.G.4 (addressing use of trading ratios to
account for uncertainty of NPS pollution reduction).
37. Id. at 11I.G.7 (evaluating both environmental and economic aspects). The
evaluations should be publicly available and any changes made to the program
should be subject to public notice and comment. See id.
38. Id. at 11I.G.7 (highlighting individual factors for evaluation).
39. Id. at III.D. The Trading Policy notes that such baselines must "be derived
from and consistent with water quality standards." Id.
40. Id. at III.D (explaining how to establish baseline without TMDL).
2004]
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IV. TMDLs: IMPACTS ON TRADING AND THE ALLOCATION-
BASELINE ANALOGY
A TMDL calculates the amount of a pollutant that a water body
can receive and still meet the water quality standard (WQS) desig-
nated for the water body. TMDLs must be established where efflu-
ent (discharge) limitations on PSs have been insufficient to meet
WQSs.4' EPA estimates that more than 40,000 TMDLs for 20,000
bodies of water still need to be established throughout the United
States. 4 2 While development of TMDLs comes at great cost,43 law-
suits against EPA have forced the development of TMDLs. 44 Even
though water quality trading has been slow to develop in spite of its
great theoretical promise,45 the need to comply with TMDLs may
promote the use of trading.46 Trading could help achieve the re-
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1) (A) (2000) (setting requirements for creation of
TMDLs).
42. Trading Water Pollution Reduction Credits, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Water Resources and Environment of the Comm. on House Transportation and Infrastruc-
ture, 109th Cong. 8 (2002) (statement of Rena Steinzor, professor, University of
Maryland School of Law), 2002 WL 20318109, at 8 [hereinafter STEINZOR
TESTIMONY].
43. See, e.g., VIRGINIA DEP'T OF CONSERVATION AND RECREATION, VIRGINIA
WATER QUALITY IMPROVEMENT FUND COOPERATIVE NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION
PROGRAM AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 319 NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION
PROGRAM 12-13 (2002) (estimating that development of TMDLs and implementa-
tion plans, without counting actual implementation, to be approximately $59.3
million in Virginia), available at http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/nps/accomplish-
ments/2001/VA2001AnnualReprt.pfd; see also, e.g., CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RES.
CONTROL BD., STRUCTURE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE STATE'S WATER QUALITY PRO-
GRAMS: SECTION 303(D) OF THE FEDERAL CLEAN WATER AcT AND TOTAL MAXIMUM
DAILY LoADs (TMDLS): REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE PURSUANT TO AB 982 OF 1999
17 (2001), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/tmdl/docs/ab982rptfinal.doc
("Currendy, the SWRCB [State Water Resources Control Board of California] esti-
mates the development of an average TMDL to be approximately $600,000.").
44. OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY,
AND IMPLEMENTATION 22-23 (1999) (demonstrating connection between litigation
and proliferation of TMDLs).
45. U.S. EXPERIENCE, supra note 16 at 99-100 (discussing trading difficulties
regarding air pollution).
46. Id. A functioning trading program sometimes might constitute a way to
avoid the need to establish a TMDL if the trading program gave sufficient promise
of meeting water quality standards. Cf. EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at
III.E.2. ("If pre-TMDL trading does not result in the attainment of applicable water
quality standards, EPA expects a TMDL to be developed."); see also FLA. STAT. ch.
403.067(4) (2002) (noting that state must add water body to state's TMDL list if
.water quality standards are not being achieved and ... other pollution control
programs.., are not sufficient to result in attainment of applicable surface water
quality standards"). This means that successful design and implementation of a
trading program, even if administratively difficult and expensive, might still pre-
sent the best option if it avoids the need to establish a TMDL. The trading pro-
gram would involve generation of both information and actual water quality
improvements, while the expense of a TMDL creates lots of information about
8
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ductions necessary to comply with TMDLs and regulatory controls
under the CWA, which would be more cost effective than making
existing regulations of PSs stricter. 47
TMDLs create a cap above which no pollution will be allowed
into a specific area, 48 thereby creating a "fully closed" trading sys-
tem. 49 Once a TMDL has been established, several different ap-
proaches can be taken to meet the TMDL. One approach involves
first determining the amount of pollutant load that occurs naturally
and as a result of NPSs, and then adding a mandated "margin of
safety."50 If any loading capacity remains, it will be divided up
among PSs. 51 Following this approach, if natural and NPS pollu-
tion exceed the TMDL, then no PS discharges will be allowed. Nev-
ertheless, unregulated NPSs might continue polluting because of
the lack of NPS regulation. 52 If PSs wish to continue activities that
give rise to pollution loading, they must secure reductions from
NPSs in the watershed by paying the NPSs to reduce their pollutant
water quality but no actual water quality improvements. Once a TMDL has been
established, EPA does not support use of a trading program to delay implementa-
tion of an approved TMDL. See EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at III.E.3.
47. Cf EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at I, III (listing EPA's specific trad-
ing objectives, including reducing cost of implementing TMDLs through greater
efficiency and flexible approaches).
48. See FERTILE GROUND, supra note 11, at 13; see also Powers, supra note 25, at
152 n.77 (noting that, while EPA has not always used "open" vs. "closed" market
terminology, open market system would not be available under TMDL).
49. See U.S. EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at V (noting that trading programs
may fall within two distinct structures: one is uncapped, or open system, and other
is capped, or closed system). An uncapped system may allow pollution to increase
if existing polluters increase their contributions or if new polluters enter the mar-
ket. Id. In such a system, a polluter may earn credits for any pollution reductions
below a stated baseline; usually, the baseline occurs in the context of a permit. Id.
In contrast to this possibility of increased pollution, a closed or capped system
sets a specific limit on how much pollution can occur in a specified area. Id. It is
important to make sure that caps are set on actual, as opposed to permitted, dis-
charges. The failure of the RECLAIM program to set a cap in California resulted
in such a cheap and plentiful supply of credits that the credits did not serve as an
incentive to reduce pollution by investment in pollution abatement. STEINZOR TES-
TIMONY, supra note 42, at 6. A closed or capped system seeks to achieve a specific
environmental goal and assigns credits to existing sources of pollution. See U.S.
EXPERIENCE, supra note 15, at 7.
A trading system should, in order to work towards the goal of the CWA, in-
clude a cap that steadily declines. See STEINZOR TESTIMONY, supra note 42; see also
CWA § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (stating that "[t]he objective of this
chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's waters" (emphasis added)); see also Powers, supra note 25, at 176-77.
50. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2000).
51. Cf 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(g)-(i) (defining allocations to PSs, NPSs, and rela-
tionship between them within TMDL).
52. See Schultz & Small, supra note 4, at 388 (discussing agriculture's relative
immunity to regulation).
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loading. This situation highlights the lack of regulatory authority
over NPSs and shifts the entire burden for reduction onto already-
regulated PSs. Forcing PSs to pay for NPS reductions to improve
water quality implicates the equitable and distributional concerns
addressed in Part VI.
The federal government has taken some steps to allow NPSs to
voluntarily get involved in reducing pollution.53 While these efforts
have benefited some waters, success has been limited. 54 For a short
time it appeared that new rules from EPA for the TMDL program
might force states to address NPS pollution by insisting on develop-
ment of TMDLs unless federally enforceable laws offered assurance
that water quality standards would be met.55 The new rules would
have required all TMDLs to contain an implementation plan that
EPA could either accept or reject. 56 These rules, however, never
went into effect and were finally withdrawn by EPA.57 Nonetheless,
existing regulations still require that pollution be divided into load
allocations for NPSs and waste load allocations for PSs. 58 Even this
gross allocation between PSs and NPSs can present difficulties. 59
53. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 3, at 72-78 (outlining 33 U.S.C. § 1329 grant
program directed towards NPS pollution).
54. Id. at 77. Williams asserts that, in large part, the failure of the § 319 (33
U.S.C. § 1392) program stems from the fact that it contains no enforceable re-
quirements for NPSs. Id. at 72-78.
55. EPA Revisions to Water Quality Planning, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586-43,590 (July
13, 2000) (explaining rules for TMDL program).
56. Id. at 43,595-96 (noting that new rules would "provide EPA with an ele-
ment missing from the current regulations, i.e., assurance that the TMDL will in
fact be implemented"). One commentator noted that the inclusion of implemen-
tation plans in the definition of TMDL provoked much resistance because inclu-
sion would effectively give EPA the power to accept or reject implementation
plans. Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program V: Aftershock and Prelude,
32 ENVWL. L. REP. 10,385, 10,411 (2002) [hereinafter Aftershock and Prelude]. More-
over, this would then be subject to judicial review at the hands of citizen groups.
See id.
57. See Revised Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,044 (Oct. 18, 2001) (establishing April
20, 2003 as effective date of revisions to EPA's Total Maximum Daily Load and
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program regulation published in
Federal Register on July 13, 2000); Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 13,608 (Mar. 19, 2003)
(withdrawing rule because EPA believes that significant changes need to be made
to July 2000 rule before it could represent workable framework for efficient and
effective TMDL). "[Flurthermore, EPA needs additional time beyond April 30,
2003 to decide whether and how to reuse the currently-effective regulations imple-
menting the TMDL program in a way that will best achieve the goals of the CWA."
Id.
58. See EPA Water Program Definitions, 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(h) (2002) (defining
TMDL as sum of allocations for PSs and NPSs).
59. For examples of very different approaches to allocate loading, compare
Florida's approach, infra notes 155-62 and accompanying text, with the approach
of Equal Marginal Percent Reduction, infra note 130 and accompanying text.
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WATER QUALITY TRADING
These obstacles are analogous to the challenges encountered in es-
tablishing a baseline for trading.60
V. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS TO ADDRESS IN TRADING PROGRAMS
While an excellent idea in theory, trading has been slow to
come into actual usage and has seldom resulted in many trades.
61
This Part highlights a few problems with water quality trading and
criticisms of trading programs that may contribute to the lackluster
adoption and performance of trading.
A. Trading Units and the "Right" to Pollute
As noted in EPA's guidelines, trading requires a clear, defina-
ble unit. Part of a clear, definable unit is the property right neces-
sary to make use of the credit.62 On one hand, assigning polluters a
property right to pollute has drawn great criticism. 63 On the other
hand, the argument has been made that not allowing pollution also
confers a property right.64 The concept of granting pollution
"rights" potentially conflicts with TMDLs 65 or with state laws.
66
60. For further discussion of the difficulties encountered in establishing a
baseline for trading, see infra notes 125-39 and accompanying text.
61. Schultz & Small, supra note 4, at 388 (noting that twenty-six trading pro-
grams referred to in EPA's 1996 Draft Framework for Watershed Based Trading
have failed to generate trades and cost savings that had been predicted); see also
Powers, supra note 25, at 139-40, 194 (noting that experiences with previous mar-
ket-based programs make it possible that even if nitrogen trading program was
established amount of trading would be minimal and that few trades have oc-
curred in existing programs); see also U.S. EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 99-100
(noting that despite potential benefit of trading and considerable effort by EPA
and states to implement concept, trading has yet to live up to its full promise).
62. EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at III.G.2; cf Kenneth D. Frederick,
Marketing Water: The Obstacles and the Impetus, in THE RFF READER IN ENVIRONMEN-
TAL AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 144 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 1999) (stating that
"[e]fficient markets also require well-defined, transferable property rights").
63. See Sean Blacklocke, Effluent Trading in South Carolina, in THE MARKET
MEETS THE ENVIRONMENT 224 (Bruce Yandle, ed. 1999); see also Schultz & Small,
supra note 4, at 384; Williams, supra note 3, at 28 (observing idea that farmers must
be "'bribed' to engage in sound, conservation-minded practices has had the subtle
effect of promoting the idea that farmers have a 'right' to engage in environmen-
tally destructive practices").
64. See R.H. Coase, supra note 20, at 2 (1960) (focusing on question of "who
gets to harm who?").
65. Tension would exist if a polluter received a "right" to pollute under a
TMDL that subsequently needed revision in order to comply with water quality
standards; if the state then reduces the right to pollute, could the holder of the
right invoke the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on takings?
66. BUREAU OF WATERSHED MGMT., FLORIDA DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., A REPORT
TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE ON THE ALLOCATION OF TOTAL MAXIMUM
DAILY LOADS IN FLORIDA § 4.1.3 (Feb. 1, 2001) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE GOVER-
NOR] (explaining that technical advisory committee in Florida noted that right to
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B. Lack of Information
Another hurdle trading faces before harnessing the potential
benefits of market economics is a problem that markets in practical
application often fall prey to - lack of information. 67 Equality of
marginal cost will never result from a trading program if transac-
tion costs are too high or information sharing among the sources
on their respective costs is not readily available. 68 This lack of infor-
mation about the relative costs of pollution reduction often pre-
vents realization of the full theoretical benefits that could arise
from trading.69
C. Modeling
EPA has emphasized that a trading program must contain a
methodology for counting the credits that have been created. 70
Many commentators have noted the difficulty of measuring reduc-
tions in loading by NPSs.71 Computer modeling has appeared as
pollute conflicts with existing regulations in State of Florida); FLA. ADMIN. CODE r.
624.242(4) (2003) (determining that property right to pollute conflicts with "equi-
table abatement" provisions of Florida Administrative Code).
67. See Schultz & Small, supra note 4, at 386 (discussing challenges of improv-
ing regulation through trading).
68. Id. (identifying information-sharing as key step in implementing trading
program); see also R.H. Coase, supra note 20. The World Resources Institute has
developed a website called NutrientNet which seeks to serve as a forum for poten-
tial buyers and sellers of water quality trading credits to locate each other, thereby
trying to reduce both informational issues and transaction costs. See What is Nu-
trientNet?, at http://www.nutrientnet.org/prototype/html/index.html (noting
that transaction costs can be substantial barrier to trading and that NutrientNet
seeks to serve as way to lower transaction costs).
69. Schultz & Small, supra note 4, at 386 (examining problems in designing
and implementing water pollution trading programs).
70. EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at III.G.4 (determining that standard-
ized protocols are necessary to qualify credits). Procedures of states and tribes
should account for the generalizations and use of credits in NPDES permits. See id.
(finding that states and tribes should discharge monitoring reports to track gener-
ation and use of credits between sources and assess compliance).
71. See, e.g., FERTILE GROUND, supra note 11, at 29 (observing that while
animal production is substantial source of nutrient pollution, good procedures for
estimating loading from different forms of animal production are lacking). Fur-
ther data collection and analysis, more information on alternative systems, and
more profitable, less resource-demanding alternatives could be identified. See id.
(noting that this information may be significant but cannot be explored because of
lack of information); see Norman Sanjem, Case Study: Minnesota Pollutant Trading at
Rahr Malting Co., Part X [hereinafter, Case Study: Minnesota] (setting out five obsta-
cles to measuring reduction in loading by NPSs), available at http://www.pca.state.
mn.us/hot/es-mn-r.html (last modified Oct. 29, 1997); see also STEINZOR TESTI-
MONY, supra note 42 (noting that we lack sufficient technology and information to
do accurate assessments of loading under control and best management practices
situations).
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the accepted method to estimate loading and reductions. Model-
ing allows for action even when complete and accurate monitoring
information from which to make decisions is not available. 72 Mod-
els, however, are not perfectly accurate and may produce very dif-
ferent results depending on the adequacy of the data and differing
interpretations of results.73 Skeptics of modeling claim that it is
possible to "model anything, any time, any place, for anyone." 74
Despite such a cynical view of modeling as a tool to "prove" what
one wants, modeling has become more accepted and refined.75
Nevertheless, modeling is subject to "gaming."76 Gaming is the
process of tinkering with the many assumptions that comprise the
complex equations used in modeling.77 By slightly altering the
many assumed values in equations, a modeler can often substan-
tially change the outcome of the model with only minor and appar-
ently reasonable changes to the variable assumptions. The
dramatic changes in the result of complex equations due to minis-
cule changes in input information have been called "sensitive de-
pendence on initial conditions."78 This cannot be entirely avoided
since modeling is not based on perfect information; as long as mod-
els require assumptions of certain values in their equations, the pos-
sibility for abuse remains.
72. Lessons from the Clean Air Act, supra note 28, at 243-44 (noting that use of
models in lieu of definite proof is useful antidote to financial and practical limita-
tions of inadequate monitoring networks, and allows progress in face of inevitable
uncertainty).
73. Charles D. Case, Problems in Judicial Review Arising from the Use of Computer
Models and Other Quantitative Methodologies in Environmental Decisionmaking, 10 B.C.
ENVTL. L. REV. 251, 274 (1982) (noting that because of policy choice and uncer-
tainty in environmental decisions resting on models and relative crudeness of sci-
entific ecological knowledge, such decisions rest in subjective assumptions and
inadequate database).
74. Id. at 279 n.150. "Without adequate understanding of the empirical con-
text, without full realization of the embedded assumptions, and without apprecia-
tion of the exclusions and omissions, a potential used is easily down the garden
path." Id.
75. Lessons from the Clean Air Act, supra note 28, at 269 (discussing use of
TMDL model).
76. See, e.g., Aftershock and Prelude, supra note 56, at 10,399-400 (explaining
widespread practice of gaming); see also Lessons from the Clean Air Act, supra note 28,
at 244-45 (noting charge that models are abused to avoid stricter obligations).
77. See, e.g., Aftershock and Prelude, supra note 56, at 10,399-400 (stating
"[c]laims are made for wholly past reductions, for the same reductions several
times, and for reductions that never happened, happened only ephemerally, or
never will happen.").
78. Peter Miller & William E. Rees, Introduction to ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY: IN-
TEGRATING ENVIRONMENT, CONSERVATION, AND HEALTH (David Pimentel, Laura
Westra & Reed F. Noss eds., 2000) (noting also that this relates to chaos theory).
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Either inherent variability or gaming can lead to predictions of
an improvement in water quality that does not actually take place.79
These difficulties indicate that water quality monitoring in receiv-
ing water bodies is the best way to quickly identify a failure to create
real water quality improvements.8 0 In addition to the uncertainty
that arises from modeling, other factors also contribute to uncer-
tainty in NPS reductions.81 The myriad uncertainties are usually
dealt with by using a safety factor in the calculation of NPS
reductions.8 2
D. Issues of Legality
In addition to the considerable technical difficulties, potential
legal problems also confront trading programs. As EPA notes, all
trading programs must comply with the CWA.8 3 EPA implies that
compliance could be accomplished by modifying the NPDES per-
79. Lessons from the Clean Air Act, supra note 28, at 244-45 (discussing problems
with use of models in lieu of definitive proof). For further discussion on the un-
certainty of the use of models as predictors, see Aftershock and Prelude, supra note
56.
80. Cf EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at II.G.7 (noting that trading pro-
gram evaluations should include ambient water quality monitoring as way to en-
sure that designated water uses are not impaired as result of trading).
81. See id. at IIL.G.4 (noting that some other reasons for uncertainty of reduc-
tions by NPSs listed by EPA include variability in precipitation, variable perform-
ance of land management practices, and effect of soils, plant cover and slope on
pollutant load delivery to receiving waters).
82. See, e.g., Ross & Assocs. ENVTL. CONSULTING, LTD., LOWER BOISE RIVER
EFFLUENT TRADING DEMONSTRATION PROJECT: SUMMARY OF PARTICIPANT RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR A TRADING FRAMEWORK 15 (2000) [hereinafter BOISE RIVER TRADING],
at http://www.deq.state.us/water/tmdls/lowerboiseeffluent/lowerboiseriver_
effluent.htm (using "uncertainty discount" to deal with variability inherent in NPS
reduction practices); see also FERTILE GROUND, supra note 11, at 15 (noting that in
Dillon Creek Reservoir trading program in Colorado, only half of expected reduc-
tions from NPSs can be applied to offset PS contributions).
[O]nly one third of the load reduction from nonpoint sources could be
applied against point source requirements (a 3:1 trading ratio). The rest
of the load reduction produced is essentially an "environmental credit" to
assure the achievement of water quality goals and account for the greater
uncertainty inherent in nonpoint source loads.
Id. at 36; see also EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at III.G.4 (advocating use of
greater than 1:1 trading ratios, conservative assumptions, or retirement of portion
of NPS credits for each transaction as way to deal with uncertainty of reductions by
NPSs).
83. EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at III.A (requiring that water quality
trading comply with CWA); see Schultz & Small, supra note 4, at 385. Schultz &
Small also believe that the lack of trading programs might be partly due to regula-
tors placing more emphasis on enforcement than on reducing compliance costs.
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mits of PSs that purchase water pollution credits . 4 Some express
skepticism that EPA has the authority to modify NPDES permits.
One commentator warns that careful companies should hesitate to
engage in trades based on EPA assertions of legality through clauses
added to NPDES permits.8 5 Others, however, do not see this as a
problem. 86 EPA's support for water quality trading and assertions
of legality would likely prevail on regulatory grounds until the CWA
could be amended should amendment prove necessary. 87
Compliance with the CWA also requires trading programs in
TMDL areas to meet applicable TMDL requisites. While a TMDL
needs EPA approval, laws and regulations need to be changed so
that minor modifications to a TMDL program due to trading do
not automatically require EPA approval. If EPA will require ap-
proval for any allocation changes to a TMDL that result from trad-
ing, such excessive oversight could inhibit trading.88
Enforcement is another aspect of legality. To enforce trading
rules, what constitutes "compliance" for NPS reductions needs to be
examined. Does compliance simply consist of certain Best Manage-
ment Practices (BMPs) 89 or other specified activities, which, accord-
84. See EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at III.F.2 (noting EPA supports
several flexible approaches for incorporating provisions for trading into NPDES
permits).
85. STEINZOR TESTIMONY, supra note 42 (asserting that allowing trading to
demonstrate compliance with permit unnecessarily exposes NPDES holder to legal
liability).
86. See Powers, supra note 25, at 185 (suggesting that, within certain confines,
Clean Water Act still permits trading).
87. See Blacklocke, supra note 63, at 226 (asserting that trading programs are
unlikely to be ruled illegal); cf U.S. EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 67:
EPA first applied the concept of marketable emission permits in the mid-
1970s as a means for new sources of emissions to locate in non-attainment
areas without causing air quality to worsen. New sources and existing
sources that wanted to expand their facilities were required to offset their
emissions by acquiring emission reduction credits from existing sources.
This important but modest beginning was based on an interpretation of
the Clean Air Act, rather than on a specific statutory authority. EPA's
Offset Policy was included in the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act
statute.
Id.
88. Cf Lessons from the Clean Air Act, supra note 28, at 269 (noting excessive
review of state implementation plans (SIPs) under Clean Air Act has bogged down
process).
89. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 18-2.017(8):
"Best management practices" means methods, measures or practices that
are developed, selected, or approved by agencies to protect, enhance and
preserve natural resources. They include, but are not limited to, engi-
neering, conservation, and management practices for mining, agricul-
ture, silviculture, and other land uses, that are designed to conserve the
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ing to a computer model, should result in a certain amount of
water quality improvement in an average year? This definition of
compliance potentially allows much greater pollution loading dur-
ing a year of heavy rainfall than a model for calculating credits
might conclude from average rainfall. A second approach might
define compliance as monitoring that occurs at the edge of the NPS
property indicating a reduction in loading. 90 While this would ap-
pear to be the safest and surest definition of compliance from an
environmental standpoint, the feasibility of direct monitoring for
NPSs is often low. A third concept of compliance could require
actual water quality improvement in the receiving water body.
While EPA did not explicitly address how to define compliance
in the context of a trading program, arguments can be made that
EPA policy could support almost any one of these conceptions.91
All the various complexities and difficulties of assessing compli-
ance-even if BMPs or specified activities are considered "compli-
ance"-may diminish enthusiasm for a trading program involving
PSs and NPSs.92
EPA also recommends looking to the compliance history of
sources that want to trade. 93 However, this leaves important ques-
soil and associated nutrients while simultaneously controlling nonpoint
pollution to provide good overall upland management.
Id.
In Florida, BMPs for agriculture "means conservation practices established by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture's Soil Conservation Service for the purpose of re-
ducing pollution from agricultural activities as applied to local conditions as set
forth in 'A Manual of Reference Management Practices for Agricultural Activities,'
Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, November 1978." Id. at 40A-
44.021(1).
90. This type of monitoring should not be confused with monitoring in water
bodies into which NPS pollution from an area empties. Such monitoring is critical
and commentators have lamented that not enough of it exists. Cf Williams, supra
note 3, at 112-13 (suggesting present system creates unevenly allocated cleanup
responsibilities and leads to finger pointing).
91. For example, EPA noted that, "due to extreme weather conditions or
other circumstances that are beyond the control of the [nonpoint] source," a fail-
ure to create credits might occur. See EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at III.G.5.
While EPA recommends that states and tribes include provisions to account for
such events, EPA did not specify how. See id. Probably the strongest argument is
that EPA envisions appropriate BMPs as compliance regardless of what occurs.
This seems supported by language noting that credits are created as long as "man-
agement practices are functioning as expected." Id. at III.G.3. The case for moni-
toring is weaker and would depend on the fact that EPA suggests monitoring as
one way of dealing with the uncertainty of NPS load reductions. Id. at III.G.4.
92. Schultz & Small, supra note 4, at 396 (discussing possibility of diminished
enthusiasm for trading programs).
93. EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at III.G.5 (suggesting mechanisms for
determining and ensuring compliance may include record keeping, monitoring,
reporting and inspections).
[Vol. XV: p. I
16
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol15/iss1/1
WATER QuALITy TRADING
tions unanswered. For example, assuming that the trade involves
use of a private contract,94 what should the legal remedy be if some-
one sells a credit that does not result in improvement in water qual-
ity?: One approach is to have the seller accept the regulatory
burden-i.e., the sanction for failure to comply with the permit-of
the buyer if the credit sold is not produced by the seller.95 Another
option would allow the buyer to give the seller a loan that can be
paid back with credits; if the credits are not produced, the loan
becomes due with interest.96 Some trading programs have recom-
mended contractual obligations, including land purchases or ease-
ments, to ensure compliance and water quality improvements
through land management programs. 97
E. Transaction Costs and Trading Ratios
The uncertainties and difficulties involved in a trading pro-
gram do not come cheaply. Administrative and transaction costs
involved in trading programs can be substantial due to the com-
plexities of calculating and tracking trades,98 especially when the
94. Use of private contracts is advocated by EPA if they are used in conjunc-
tion with legislation, rule making, and other legal mechanisms. Id. at III.G.1. Pri-
vate contracts form part of a pilot project in Idaho. See BoISE RIVER TRADING, supra
note 82, at 7.
95. FERTILE GROUND, supra note 11, at 41. This and the following examples
assume that a point source buyer's NPDES permit would allow compliance with
permit limits by trading. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
96. FERTILE GROUND, supra note 11, at 41. However, if the buyer has now
come under enforcement action for violation of a NPDES permit due to the
seller's failure to produce the credit purchased, it is unlikely that the buyer would
be satisfied to simply get back the purchase price plus interest. Even were the
buyer satisfied with this arrangement, water quality still loses in such a scenario if
credits contracted for are not produced.
97. See, e.g., Case Study: Minnesota, supra note 71, at Part VII (malting company
satisfied TMDL requirements by accepting restricted conditions on its wastewater
and reducing upstream loading by equal amount).
98. For the seminal discussion of the importance of transaction costs, see gener-
ally Coase, supra note 20. For treatments specifically related to water quality trad-
ing, see FERTILE GROUND, supra note 11, at 16 (noting that some trading programs
make trading prohibitive since programs increase administrative and transaction
costs). See also U.S. EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at V (noting that high transaction
costs can especially be problematic in open (uncapped) trading systems); see also
id. at 20 ("[L]iterature ... predicts large, potential savings. Available evidence on
actual achievements, however, points to relatively modest savings from most of the
programs. In searching for the reasons for why such a large gap exists ... ,Stavins
(2000) identifies transaction costs as the primary culprit."); see also Schultz & Small,
supra note 4, at 380 (noting complexity of administrative and informational requi-
sites); see also id. at 386 (discussing conflicts of interest between principals and
agents that may impede pollution sources from trading); see also Powers, supra note
25, at 211-12, 215 (noting that programs become increasingly difficult and expen-
sive as they become more complex).
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program focuses on environmental improvement.99 Administrative
costs, however, must form part of the consideration of how to value
any benefit associated with trading,100 as such costs are likely to get
underestimated in policy analysis 0 1 and are typically much higher
than initially contemplated. 0 2 In fact, administrative costs of trad-
ing, including monitoring, tracking, and accounting, can go be-
yond the budgets of some states. 10 3 Unfortunately, the greater the
amount of detail put into a trading program to make it more accu-
rately reflect the complexities of reality, the higher the administra-
tive and transaction costs.1 0 4 The use of detailed trading ratios
exemplifies problems of complexity and administrative cost.
Trading programs utilize trading ratios 0 5 to account for uncer-
tainties inherent in the use of NPS controls to reduce loading.10 6
For example, in agricultural NPS pollution, concern with sedimen-
tation means that instead of only estimating the total amount of
erosion occurring on a parcel of land, the amount of that erosion
that actually reaches a waterway as sediment must also be esti-
mated.'0 7 The ratios in such a case are known as delivery rates or
99. See Richard T. Woodward, Ronald A. Kaiser, & Aaron-Marie Wicks, The
Structure and Practice of Water-Quality Trading Markets, 38 JoURNAL OF THE AMERICAN
WATER RESOURCES AssOCIATION 967 (2002), available at http://ageco.tamu.edu/
faculty/woodward/paps/structures.pdf [hereinafter Structure and Practice]
("[R]ules that are put in place to ensure environmental efficacy frequently lead to
less efficient markets by increasing transaction costs or decreasing flexibility.").
100. Blacklocke, supra note 63, at 214 (conducting cost-benefit analysis of per-
formance of water pollution trading program).
101. Id. at 215 (explaining how administrative costs tend to be underesti-
mated when evaluating benefits and costs of trading policy).
102. See Powers, supra note 25, at 215 (adding that possibility of environmen-
tal impacts also raises administrative costs).
103. Aftershock and Prelude, supra note 56, at 10,399-10,400 (identifying cost as
significant difficulty of trading schemes).
104. See Structure and Practice, supra note 99, at 976-86 (providing examples of
increased transaction costs); see also Powers, supra note 25, at 215 (explaining nega-
tive aspects of utilizing trading ratios). The same is true of adding too much flexi-
bility to a trading program. Cf STEINZOR TESTIMONY, supra note 42 (noting that
one lesson from EPA's XL program was that one cannot make program too flexi-
ble or open-ended since resulting vagueness and flexibility can lead to hopeless
wrangling which effectively raises transaction costs to levels that exceed what is
saved).
105. See, e.g., Schultz & Small, supra note 4, at 382 (explaining trading ratios);
see also BOISE RIVER TRADING, supra note 82, at 12-14 (describing trading system
using ratios).
106. See BOISE RrIVER TRADING, supra note 82, at 12-14 (using "uncertainty dis-
count" for NPS calculations); see also Schultz & Small, supra note 4, at 382, 396
(explaining how ratios are used to account for uncertainties).
107. FERTILE GROUND, supra note 11, at 29 (explaining need to also estimate
amounts).
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sediment delivery ratios.108 The additional administrative proce-
dures and measurements required to calculate delivery rates make
the trading ratio more complex and difficult to manage. The re-
sulting increase in administrative costs diminishes the cost savings
that might accrue from trading.
F. Creating Value for Pollution Credits
One other potential problem is the need to create value for
trading credits. If no one needs to purchase credits, then the cred-
its lack value and private parties will not invest in water quality im-
provements just to create worthless or low-value credits. A fully
open trading system 109 appears to have the most problems creating
value for credits because the lack of a limit on pollution increases
means that existing and potential sources have less need for credits.
The opposite of this appears in a fully closed system in which all
possible sources of pollution must meet strict limits; fully closed sys-
tems are exceptionally rare because they require imposing enforce-
able limits on NPSs as well as PSs.110
Typically, value for credits is created by requiring pollution re-
ductions from or placing stringent limits on pollutant loadings
from sources already subject to regulatory authority.11 a While such
a system could be either an open or closed system, both effectively
force PSs subject to regulatory authority to either reduce their own
108. Id. (explaining ratio method for soil deposits). Related observations re-
cur through many sources. See, e.g., Schultz & Small, supra note 4, at 392.
109. See U.S. Experience, supra note 16, at 67 (explaining differences between
"capped" and "uncapped" trading systems).
110. The best example of which the author is aware that comes close to fitting
this description is the Lake Okeechobee Protection Program outlined in Florida
Statutes 373.4595 (2002). The law says that "[w]here agricultural nonpoint source
best management practices or interim measures have been adopted by rule.. . the
owner or operator of an agricultural nonpoint source addressed by such rule shall
either implement interim measures or best management practices or demonstrate
compliance with the district's WOD program by conducting monitoring pre-
scribed by the department or district." FLA. STAT. ch. 373.4595 (2002). Thus,
while not directly imposing specific numerical limits, regulations require use of
BMPs by agriculture. Id.
111. See, e.g., Riggs, supra note 24, at 196 (noting that for trading programs to
work, those contributing to pollution must see that binding constraint exists
before they will participate in trading program); see also Powers, supra note 25, at
214 (suggesting successful pollutant trading program should have stringent limita-
tions on pollution loading to serve as market driver).
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pollution or fund reductions by NPSs.112 The Tar-Pamlico Basin 113
and part of the Saginaw Bay project in Wisconsin' 1 4 serve as exam-
ples of this approach. 115 While some advocate this approach as a
reasonable and effective way to fund NPS abatement,' 16 others have
asked if it is fair to force PSs to pay for pollution reduction by NPSs
simply because existing regulatory authority makes it easier than
forcing NPSs to pay.117 In addition to these difficult equity and dis-
tributive questions, who pays for NPS reductions also implicates effi-
ciency concerns.
VI. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: DISTRIBUTIONAL CONCERNS
AND EFFICIENCY
The fact that incentive-based approaches such as trading have
not received greater acceptance and more use may stem partly from
the fact that they can result in distributional changes as to who pays
112. In the open system version, a cap exists on the individual NPDES permits
of the PSs and provisions would allow the PSs to comply with the permit by secur-
ing load reductions from NPSs. In the closed version, an overall cap would be
placed on the total amount of pollution, virtually forcing the PS to evaluate if it
would be cheaper for the PS to install new equipment or pay for reductions by
NPSs. In either scenario, the PSs are still forced to either reduce their own loading
or secure reductions by NPSs since the bulk of NPSs are not subject to such regula-
tion. See, e.g., STEINZOR TESTIMONY, supra note 42 (advocating strict caps on
sources to create "adequate scarcity of marketable allowances to ensure that trad-
ing remains economically attractive"). As long as NPSs are largely free from regu-
latory constraints, any creation of scarcity of marketable allowances will have to be
created by reducing the amount that regulated-i.e. point-sources can
discharge.
113. NORTH CAROLINA NONPOINT SOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, NORTH
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, PHASE I: POINT
SOURCE - NONPOINT SOURCE NUTRIENT TRADING PROGRAM, at http://h2o.enr.
state.nc.us/nps/tarpam.htm#phasel (last modified Feb. 10, 2002) (describing Tar-
Pamlico strategy to reduce nutrient input to estuary).
114. FERTILE GROUND, supra note 11, at 21 (noting that PSs formed partner-
ship and assessed themselves fees in order to undertake study and monitoring of
their hydrologic basin and to petition for extension on regulations in order to give
them time to study trading program).
115. See Aftershock and Prelude, supra note 56, at 10,402 (noting that while in-
dustry point sources have typically funded their own pollution abatement, NPSs,
even when including some of country's largest corporations, have largely been
paid for by government).
116. STEINZOR TESTIMONY, supra note 42. Steinzor asserts that because gov-
ernment organizations lack funds, PSs should pay the overhead for trading since
PSs benefit from these programs. Id. However, this ignores the fact that any "ben-
efit" to the PSs of decreased regulatory compliance cost only results from the fact
that NPSs can more cheaply reduce pollution because the NPSs have not, like the
rest of the industry, been forced to reduce their most blatant and easily controlled
pollution. Id.
117. FERTILE GROUND, supra note 11, at 37 (positing that regulating PSs is
politically easiest route).
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the bills and who benefits." 8 While much analysis has focused on
the efficiency and cost-saving' 19 expected to occur as a result of
water quality trading programs, much less time has been devoted to
issues of equity lurking in the implementation of water quality trad-
ing.120 Indeed, it has been noted that since the field of law and
economics has been influencing legal policy, it has focused almost
exclusively on "efficiency" or the "simple sum of the costs and bene-
fits that they impose on the population without regard to how those
costs and benefits are distributed among different individuals."'121
Yet any change in policy unavoidably implicates distributional con-
cerns.1 22 Expanding this rationale, one observes that even the sta-
tus quo regulatory framework implies certain distributive effects,
which, in turn, affect how different groups view potential
changes. 123 Because the idea that economics can be neutral with
regards to distributive effects is mistaken, 124 a distributional analysis
118. Robert V. Percival, Alan S. Miller, Christopher Schroeder & James P.
Leape, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, SCIENCE, AND POLICY, 174-76 (3d ed.,
2000) (describing economic incentive approach to regulation).
119. In this context, I am using "efficiency" to mean achieving maximum
water quality improvement/pollution abatement for the least possible cost. U.S.
EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 2 ("To achieve maximum cost effectiveness, each
source should control pollution to the point where the last units of pollution cost
the same amount to control at each source."). This is different from the way an
economist would define efficiency. See id. "To achieve efficiency, the situation that
maximizes the difference between benefits and costs, pollution should be con-
trolled until the per-unit costs of controlling pollution that are faced by each
source are equal to the incremental value of damage to health and the environ-
ment caused by that pollution." Id. While this latter approach might be prefera-
ble, it is virtually impossible to apply accurately under actual conditions and is
more an academic or theoretical exercise. Id. Our goal should be to get as close
to the latter definition as possible and then to reduce to that point in the least-cost
manner possible.
120. See Schultz & Small, supra note 4, at 381 (observing that water quality
trading solution to water impairment "ignores concerns about whether the result-
ing distribution of costs is equitable"). Cf J.B. Ruhl, Farmland Stewardship: Can
Ecosystems StandAny More of It?, 9 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 1, 16 (2002) (noting equity
now demands that we demand pollution reductions from agriculture in order to
improve water quality) [hereinafter Farmland Stewardship].
121. Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1005 (2001). The footnote to the cited text gives a list of
articles for a review of various concepts of efficiency. Id. at 1005, n.1. The author
also notes that some writers, such as Bruce Ackerman, Jennifer H. Arlen, and
Guido Calabresi, among others, have actually considered distributional effects in
their analyses.
122. See Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100
YALE L.J. 1211, 1212, 1215 (1991) (explaining effect of transaction costs).
123. Id. at 1214, 1227-28 (discussing symmetry between market and command
systems).
124. Id. at 1227 (noting that interpersonal comparisons in economics can no
longer be ignored; there are winners and losers in every transaction).
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should be included in the decision-making processes and any as-
sumptions should be made explicit. 125 This Part addresses current
assumptions and distributive impacts of the treatment of agricul-
tural NPS pollution and how these should affect establishment of
baselines for trading programs and regulation of agricultural NPS
pollution.
A. Establishing a Baseline
EPA has made clear that trading credits only result from reduc-
tions beyond those already required by law. 126 Thus, existing legal
requirements for pollution control form the baseline for creation
of credits for trading. If a TMDL has not been established in an
area, the relevant legal requirements for PSs usually only include
NPDES permits, which establish the baseline waste load.127 This
makes the issue of where the baseline is for those with NPDES per-
mits relatively simple. 128
Establishing a baseline for agricultural NPSs presents greater
difficulties. If a TMDL has already been established, the load allo-
cations for NPSs comprise the baseline. This demonstrates the im-
portance of establishing the baseline or load allocation in a TMDL.
At this point in the analysis, establishing a load allocation for a
TMDL and a baseline for a trading program where a TMDL has not
been established are functionally the same; in either case, since
monitoring of actual NPS loading rarely takes place, modeling typi-
cally serves to establish the loading of NPSs. In addition to the
problems with modeling that were noted earlier, 129 the question
becomes what should be modeled. Should the actual practices of
individual NPSs be modeled? Or should the actual current load-
ings of a specific type of land use that contributes to NPS pollution
125. Id. at 1228 (discussing benefits of distributional analysis on
policymaking).
126. EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at III.D (providing definition and
examples of reduction credits).
127. CWA does not give federal authority over most NPS pollution. Williams,
supra note 3, at 90-91. Thus, the usual determinant of regulatory authority over
NPSs depends on state law. Environmental Law of Farms, supra note 13, at notes 124-
26 and accompanying text. The Environmental Law Institute concluded after a
survey of states that few states have much regulatory control over agricultural NPS
pollution. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, ENFORCEABLE STATE MECHANISMS FOR
THE CONTROL OF NONPOINT SOURCE WATER POLLUTION (1997); ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw INSTITUTE, RESEARCH REPORT: ALMANAC OF ENFORCEABLE STATE LAwS TO CON-
TROL NONPOINT SOURCE WATER POLLUTION (1998).
128. See Environmental Law of Farms, supra note 13, 113-19 and accompanying
text (noting how TMDLs impact water bodies).
129. See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
[Vol. XV: p. 1
22
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol15/iss1/1
WATER QuALiTY TRADING
be modeled? If the latter, should the total then be prorated accord-
ing to acres owned or managed by individual NPSs?
Modeling each individual NPS and assigning an allocation
based on current loadings appears to be the worst option. 130 If a
baseline is established simply by reducing all current agricultural
NPS loadings by the same percentage until the needed levels of re-
duction are reached, those farmers who previously loaded the most
receive the advantage of a higher baseline even if their overall
amount of reductions is larger. The same farmer has the additional
advantage of now using the cheapest and easiest BMPs to reduce
loading because they were not in use before. This effectively pun-
ishes a good steward who has been using methods to control or
prevent pollution. The good steward will probably not have the ad-
vantage of the easiest pollution-abatement BMPs since they were
likely already in use. In addition to this obstacle, the good steward
will also have to reduce pollution to a much lower level than a noto-
rious polluter because the good steward had already reduced pollution.
Thus, such a steward has less ability to create credits for sale despite
having been a good steward of the land on a voluntary basis before
getting paid to do so. Meanwhile, an NPS polluter who has taken
no abatement measures would have the cheapest and easiest abate-
ment measures still available to implement to create credits. Thus,
exclusive or substantial reliance on current individual loadings as a
baseline punishes the good, rewards the bad, and further encour-
ages agriculture to continue externalizing its pollution costs.
In contrast to modeling individual NPSs, some states have cho-
sen to allocate to NPSs based solely on aggregates of land use within
a basin.13' EPA adopted this approach in its policy on trading.1 3 2
This allows each type of land use in a watershed to work together as
130. See Div. OF ASSESSMENT AND STANDARDS, PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF ENVTL.
RESOURCES, EQUAL MARGINAL PERCENT REDUCTION WASTELOAD ALLOCATION POLICY
(1987) (providing description of how to model each individual NPS).
131. E.g., Telephone interview with Ron McBride, TMDL Coordinator, Wash-
ington Department of Environmental Quality (June 24, 2002) (discussing various
states' approaches to dealing with NPSs pollution); see also REPORT TO THE GOVER-
NOR, supra note 66 (assigning allocations to NPDES permit holders and "general
allocations to level of major categories of nonpoint sources"). This approach ac-
knowledges the reality that many NPSs are subject to little or no regulatory author-
ity and that the actions of these pollution sources can only be affected by
incentives and voluntary actions. Assigning load allocations to individual NPSs is
viewed as too threatening an action, which impedes getting the voluntary coopera-
tion of the NPSs involved in the pollution problem. Thus, securing voluntary co-
operation is best served by keeping NPS allocations at the most general level
possible.
132. EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6, at III.D (discussing baselines for
water quality trading).
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a group. Working with a familiar representative or agency should
allow the group more involvement and control in the process. 133
This approach does not punish good stewards because the alloca-
tion or baseline is based on an aggregate loading by agriculture or
other land use; a good steward will get an allocation similar to that
of a highly-polluting farmer if the aggregate allocation is individu-
ally prorated according to the amount of land owned or managed
by an NPS pollution source. While some minor problems with the
aggregate baseline or allocation can be overcome by other provi-
sions in a trading program,13 4 this approach still rewards agricul-
ture in general for remaining free of regulatory controls. The
reward comes in the form of a higher baseline for credit creation
compared to the average level of existing agricultural NPS
pollution.
Another approach for establishing a trading baseline is to
model the loading for agricultural NPSs as if all agriculture in the
watershed were utilizing specified BMPs to avoid NPS pollution.
This approach does not punish those already utilizing BMPs since
they now have the same ability to create credits as those who did
not use BMPs. At the same time, this system would place the great-
est burden for reductions on those using farming methods that pol-
lute the most.
This raises yet another complicating factor in that those farm-
ers using practices that tend to cause the most pollution may or
may not be the farmers causing the worst agricultural pollution
problem depending on the position of the farmers relative to the
water body that receives the agricultural pollution. As noted ear-
lier, erosion taking place in a field or at the edge of a field may
differ dramatically from the amount of sediment from that field's
erosion that actually ends up in a water body.1 35 The same holds
true for agricultural NPS pollution in general. The ability of a trad-
ing program with delivery ratios to focus on such differences
133. See REPORT TO THE GOvERNOR, supra note 66, at § 1.5, tbl.4 (explaining
how groups can gain more input into trading policy process and noting members
of technical advisory committee).
134. Such an approach does not address the critical factor of how close the
source of pollution is to a water body and thus how much pollutant produced by
the source actually arrives in the water affected. See supra notes 105-08 and accom-
panying text (discussing use of trading ratios). This weakness can, however, be
overcome by implementing trading ratios that use delivery ratios to account for
proximity to water. Id.
135. See id.
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through market incentives comprises the real genius and appeal of
trading.136
Establishing a baseline founded on assumed BMP usage would,
however, undermine the potential cost savings of trading because
the BMPs will include the cheapest and easiest management tech-
niques for reducing agricultural NPS pollution. 137 Further reduc-
tions below specified BMPs would then presumably cost more to
implement and thus reduce the marginal cost differential between
NPS and PS reductions that is so crucial to the success of a trading
program.' 38 While agriculture might portray the imposition of
BMPs as unfair, 139 it should be acknowledged that the considerable
marginal cost differences for reductions between PSs and NPSs ex-
ist because agriculture, unlike industry, has seldom had to control
its pollution. 40
B. Efficiency Considerations
Externalization of agriculture's pollution costs leads not only
to distributional concerns, but also to efficiency concerns. 14' Con-
ventional economic analysis makes farming practices that exter-
136. See BOISE RIVER TRADING, supra note 82 (providing excellent example of
pilot trading program that implements these factors).
137. Cf REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, supra note 66, at 3.1 (stating BMP "refers
to a practice or combination of practices that, based on sound science and best
professional judgment, are determined to be the most effective and practicable means
of reducing nonpoint source pollution and improving water quality. Both economic
and technological considerations are included in the evaluation of what is practica-
ble." (emphasis added)). "[T]he BMP development process should take into ac-
count the economic resources available and the feasibility of the management
measures." Id. at 4.1.1. "BMPs take economic constraints into account." Id. at
4.2.3.
138. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing factors in cost
analysis and impact of reductions in NPSs).
139. E.g., Williams, supra note 3, at 28 (noting farmers may view any " 'base-
line' shift.., that implicitly assign [sic] entitlements to cleaner water to citizens" as
unfair).
140. See id. at 25 (noting need for more federal regulation for agricultural
pollution). Cf also REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, supra note 66, at 4.1.1 (noting that
"traditional point sources are required to provide, at a minimum, Best Available
Technology Economically Achievable (BAT)," and that therefore, nonpoint
sources of pollution, "especially those not subject to Florida's stormwater or envi-
ronmental resource permits," should be expected to provide, at minimum, compa-
rable levels of treatment).
141. The concept of internalizing costs forms an inherent part of the "pol-
luter pays principle." See, e.g., David Hunter et al., CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 32-33 (1994) (citing Principle 16 of Rio Declaration, pro-
viding that "national authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of
environmental costs.., taking into account the approach that the polluter should,
in principle, bear the cost of pollution").
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nalize costs to the environment look more efficient than those
practices that reduce impacts on the environment. 142 Accounting
for externalized costs and inputting them into the analysis allows
conservation-type farming methods to compete economically. 143
Current agricultural policy in the United States, by virtue of its non-
regulation of agricultural NPSs, largely allows agriculture to exter-
nalize its pollution costs to the detriment of the competitiveness of
conservation-based agriculture. Farm policy often works against
stewardship-oriented farmers, 144 and subsidy programs often pro-
mote environmental harm. 145 Economic analysis even shows that
agricultural subsidy programs aimed at improving the environment
often fail to efficiently address environmental concerns. 146
142. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND SUSTAINABILITY.
CASE STUDIES FROM INDIA, THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES viii (Paul Faeth
ed., 1993) [hereinafter WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE] (noting theme emerging in
study).
143. Id. (noting affect of including natural resource base in calculation of
farm income).
144. Id. at 10 (discussing Pennsylvania farm study).
145. U.S. EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 141.
The effect of the price support program for sugar on the Florida Ever-
glades is frequently cited as an example of an environmentally harmful
subsidy. The federal government subsidizes the sugar industry by guaran-
teeing a floor price of $0.18 per pound, which is almost twice the price on
world markets. This U.S. policy is further supported by tariffs of $0.16
per pound on imported sugar that is in excess of quota levels. In 1992,
this support program resulted in $161.5 million in benefits for sugarcane
farmers and $107.7 million for processors. This increases the amount of
water diverted to sugarcane fields as well as the amount of runoff. The
diversion and the runoff, which is contaminated with pesticides and fertil-
izers that sugarcane growers apply to maximize production, damage the
ecosystem of the Everglades. Agricultural subsidies appear to be having
similar adverse effects elsewhere in the United States.
Id. Eleven years later, sugarcane production in the United States continues to re-
ceive enormous subsidies in the form of price supports; for the effect of these
subsidies on the price of sugar, one only need look to the Wall Street JournaL On
November 20, 2003, the Wall Street Journal listed the futures prices of sugar on the
world market between 6.29 cents per pound and 6.44 cents per pound. A separate
listing gives the "domestic" sugar futures prices as ranging between 20.75 cents per
pound to 21.45 cents per pound. WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2003, at C14. One can
hardly be faulted for asking why we permit our government to spend millions and
millions of dollars to subsidize sugar production that harms the Everglades and
raises the price of sugar.
146. Paul Faeth, THE WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, GROWING GREENER: EN-
HANCING THE ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE OF U.S. AGRICULTURE
28 (1995) (showing Conservation Reserve Program, in table 2-6, is aimed at reduc-
ing soil erosion and yet has highest enrollment in areas with lowest offsite soil
erosion problems while area with greatest soil erosion has lowest enrollment). Cf
Williams, supra note 3, at 108 (noting amount of money spent on Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP)-$1.7 billion- amounts to almost half of all federal con-
servation spending).
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While the efficiency of cost internalization dictates that agricul-
ture should shoulder its costs to abate its pollution as we have re-
quired of other industries and activities, 147 policy regarding
agriculture and the environment should, at a minimum, not be
structured in a way that promotes environmental harm. Our policy
should also avoid hurting small producers and those who have vol-
untarily reduced their pollution. 148 Otherwise the policy inadver-
tently sends the message that the best stewards of the land get
punished for their naivet6 in doing the "right" thing, while those
who insisted on payment to not pollute get the advantage. 149
VII. ISSUES WITH STATE LAWS
During the design of trading programs, consideration of fed-
eral law and the CWA must be augmented by examination of state
laws. Some state laws and regulations protecting water and control-
ling agriculture are much broader in scope and stricter than federal
regulations. 150 In addition to schemes that regulate more activities
and areas, some state laws contain requirements that efforts to con-
trol or reduce pollution must occur with careful consideration of
147. If U.S. farmers internalized pollution cost, then they would not be able
to compete in the international market. Environmental Law of Farms, supra note 13,
at text preceding note 58; see also id. at notes 259-60 and accompanying text (not-
ing that "international trade policy must be changed to eliminate the concern that
further financial burdens on U.S. farmers will put them at competitive disadvan-
tages with less environmentally responsible countries"). Despite increased costs, it
may be possible to harmonize free trade and agricultural support programs that
focus on the system's environmental benefits. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra
note 142, at 12. The increased food cost argument fails to consider that in 1997,
U.S. farms captured only seven cents of each dollar that a consumer spent on their
farm products in a grocery store. Brian Halweil, The Worldwatch Institute, Farm-
ing in the Public Interest, in STATE OF THE WORLD 2002, at 56 (2002). Thus, a mod-
est increase in the costs of farm commodities would have a minimal effect on the
prices the consumer pays since ninety-three percent of consumer costs go to food
processors, food marketers, and agricultural input suppliers. Cf. id.
148. See Kershen, supra note 4, at 7, 65 (stating current statute financially re-
wards farmers and ranchers who are not environmentally conscious on their land).
For the importance of phasing out counterproductive subsidies in the environ-
mental field before engaging in further regulation, see Carol M. Rose, Property
Rights and Responsibilities, THINKING ECOLOGICALLY 49, 56 (Marian R. Chertow &
Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997).
149. Cf Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243-48 (1968)
(applying tragedy of commons concept to pollution).
150. See, e.g., Kentucky Agriculture Water Quality Act, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 224.71-100 to-140 (Banks-Baldwin 1999) (requiring any agricultural operation
over ten contiguous acres of land to develop and implement water quality plan
based on BMPs). For a comprehensive overview of enforceable state laws pertain-
ing to NPS pollution, see ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, ALMANAC OF ENFORCEA-
BLE STATE LAWS TO CONTROL NONPOINT SOURCE WATER POLLUTION (1998), http://
www.elistore.org/data/products/d8.07.pdf.
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the equitable outcomes that may result.15' This Part uses the laws
and regulations of Florida to illustrate the importance of a legal
requirement to consider equity in pollution abatement. Of course,
many of the points about equity raised by the following discussion
have logical force independent of a legal state requirement to con-
sider equitable issues.
In Florida, as in many states, "[n] onpoint source (NPS) pollu-
tion is the largest contributor of pollutants to . . . surface and
ground waters."'152 Trading has been advocated in Florida as a way
to deal with this problem.15 3 Furthermore, Florida statutes allow
trading programs to serve as a way to avoid the need to establish
TMDLs. 154
151. At least two states have statutory language indicating that pollution
abatement must take into account equitable considerations. See AIz. REv. STAT.§ 49-231(3); FLA. STAT. ch. 403.067(1) (2002). "The scientifically based total maxi-
mum daily load program is necessary to fairly and equitably allocate pollution
loads to both nonpoint and point sources." FLA. STAT. ch. 403.067(1).
152. FLORIDA NONPOINT SOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM UPDATE (Nov. 1999),
available at http://www.dep.state.fl.us/water/nonpoint/pubs.htm. The Florida
Administrative Code, like federal regulations, exempts almost all agriculture from
the definition of point source. FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 62-620.200(35). "'Point
source' means any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance, including any
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, landfill leachate collection system,
vessel or other floating craft from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This
term does not include return flows from irrigated agriculture or agricultural stormwater run-
off" Id. (emphasis added).
153. E.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 403.067(7)(a) (2002) (showing that DEP controls
maximum daily loads through water quality protection programs); see also REPORT
TO THE GOvERNOR, supra note 66, at § 4.1.3 (noting potential for water quality
trading).
154. FLA STAT. ch. 403.067(4) (2002). This statute states that TMDLs will only
need to be established if water quality standards are not being met and "other
pollution control programs.., are not sufficient to result in attainment of applica-
ble surface water quality standards." Id. If a trading program could be deemed
'sufficient to result in attainment," then a TMDL need not be established. Id.
While the text of the TMDL program in § 303(d) of the CWA (33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(d)) does not expressly provide such a potential escape hatch from estab-
lishing a TMDL, federal regulations do have a somewhat similar provision. 40
C.F.R. § 130.7(b) (1) (iii) (2002). This section of the Code of Federal Regulations
requires the identification of water quality limited segments needing a TMDL
where "other pollution control requirements (e.g., best management practices)
required by local, State, or Federal authority are not stringent enough to imple-
ment any water quality standards (WQS) applicable to such waters." Id. One
might, as Florida has done, interpret this regulation to mean that TMDLs need not
be developed where some assurance of meeting water quality standards exists.
Note, however, that the federal regulations refer to "pollution control require-
ments," not "assurances." See id. This implies that voluntary programs not subject
to enforcement should not suffice under federal regulations, and a simple state
policy of designing BMPs and aiding with voluntary implementation or designing a
voluntary trading program should not be construed to fulfill federal regulatory
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As noted above, since a baseline for trading and a baseline for
TMDL allocations appear analogous, Florida's approach to TMDL
allocation seems particularly relevant.1 55 Florida statutes require
that TMDLs "shall include establishment of reasonable and equita-
ble allocations of the total maximum daily load among point and
nonpoint sources. 1 56 Furthermore, allocations should consider
the following: existing treatment and management practices; differ-
ing impacts pollutants may have on water quality; the availability of
treatment technologies and management practices; environmental,
economic, and technological feasibility of achieving the allocation;
and the cost-benefit associated with achieving the allocation. 157
This long list of factors effectively allowed the Florida legisla-
ture to avoid making the most difficult and detailed determinations
regarding allocations. 58 A report on allocation strategies for
TMDLs,159 however, did note that TMDL allocations for NPSs
should be premised on NPSs being subjected to BMPs as the NPS
equivalent of best available technology (BAT)160 for PSs.161 This,
said the report, would constitute the first step toward equity by "lev-
eling the playing field" between PSs and NPSs before requiring any
additional pollution reductions from PSs. 1 62
This means that a trading program operating under a TMDL
cap in Florida cannot base allocations between PSs and NPSs on the
current actual loadings of individual NPSs. It also appears that in
requirements for exemption from establishing a TMDL in a water which otherwise
requires one according to 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1) (A) (2001).
155. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (describing establishment
of baseline).
156. FLA. STAT. ch. 403.067(6) (b) (2002) (showing such allocations may de-
termine maximum amount of water pollutant from given source).
157. FLA. STAT. ch. 403.067(6) (b) (1-6) (2002) (citing consideration for allo-
cating daily loads).
158. REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, supra note 66, at § 4.1.1 (noting that techni-
cal advisory committee writing report "developed recommendations for expanding
upon the legislative direction to provide for a 'reasonable and equitable' allocation
of a TMDL.").
159. Id. FL. STAT. ch. 403.067(6)(b)(1999) (requiring this report).
160. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (2) (B) (2001). "[A]ssessment of best available
technology shall take into account the age of equipment and facilities involved, the
process employed, the engineering aspects of the application of various types of
control techniques, process changes, the cost of achieving such effluent reduction,
non-water quality environmental impact (including energy requirements), and
such other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate." Id.
161. See REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, supra note 66, at § 4.1.1; see also Aftershock
and Prelude, supra note 56, at n.459 (noting that technology controls have been
critical in success of CWA and that to seriously clean up agricultural water pollu-
tion, we need to subject agriculture to its own form of BATs).
162. .REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, supra note 66, at § 4.1.1.
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most instances 163 a trading program could not even follow the sug-
gestion of EPA to establish baselines according to "the level of pol-
lutant load associated with existing land uses and management
practices that comply with applicable state, local, or tribal regula-
tions"'164 since to do so would not be "reasonable and equitable"
unless all agriculture in the area of concern had already imple-
mented BMPs. Considering that the law requiring reasonable and
equitable allocation only applies to TMDLs, this leaves the question
as to whether a trading program in Florida could still use current
individual NPS loadings or current aggregate land-use category
loadings as the measure of baseline to create trading credits.
Clearly such an approach would conflict with the acknowledgment
that PSs have long been forced to internalize costs that agriculture
has continued to externalize. The similarity of establishing a base-
line for TMDL allocations and a baseline for trading indicates that
the same argument regarding "leveling the playing field" should
logically apply to a baseline for creating tradable credits as much as
it applies to TMDL allocations. Furthermore, allowing current indi-
vidual loadings to establish baselines for trading would reward pol-
luters and punish the best agricultural stewards. 165 Thus, state law
in Florida implies that a baseline for creating trading credits should
assume implementation of agricultural BMPs in order to further
equitable considerations.
While some assert that it makes little sense to talk about tech-
nological controls on NPSs, 166 imposing BMPs on agriculture has
the potential to accomplish as much pollution reduction for NPSs
as imposing BAT on PSs has accomplished.1 6 7 Professor J.B. Ruhl
makes an excellent case that regulations could be limited to the
"agro-industrial farm operations" which are "low-hanging fruit ripe
for the picking," as represented by the largest factory and industrial
163. See id. (designating instances in which BMPs have not been required of
agriculture).
164. EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6 (describing baselines for water quality
trading).
165. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
166. Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Roger E. Meiners, The Failure of EPA's
Water Quality Reforms: From Environment-Enhancing Competition to Uniformity and Pol-
luter Profits, 20 UCLAJ. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 25, 46 (2001) (recognizing that NPSs are
hard to pinpoint); see also Williams, supra note 3, at 27 (noting that "technology-
based approach with uniform effluent limitations appear[s] quite fantastical").
But cf Williams, supra note 3, at 59 (noting that today farmers are becoming "tech-
nology applicators" for agribusiness food chain).
167. Aftershock and Prelude, supra note 56, at 10,415 (explaining most pollution
of NPSs is coming from agricultural sources); see also Kershen, supra note 4, at 6-7
(discussing programs utilizing BMPs).
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farms,1 68 while application of BMPs to most parts of the agricultural
sector would be much more varied and flexible in accord with the
differences in agriculture. 169 In particular, the imposition of BMPs
could vary depending on the location and other attributes of an
agricultural operation that, in conjunction with weather, determine
the amount of actual pollution loading that results in the contem-
plated water body. This is commensurate with the idea of efficiency
because it focuses the burden of reductions on those whose activi-
ties contribute the most pollution.
The problem remains that even if requiring BMPs would "level
the playing field," BMPs to address NPS pollution are largely volun-
tary. 170 The Florida Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP) emphasizes that the BMP manuals for agriculture are educa-
tional, not regulatory, documents. 71 While Florida water manage-
ment districts have incorporated BMPs into their regulatory
schemes by making them permit requirements, 172 this only makes
BMPs mandatory in the limited circumstances under which an agri-
cultural operation needs a permit.1 7 3
The fact that Florida occasionally demands BMPs of agricul-
ture does not address all the economic analysis arguments
168. J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 335-36 (2000) (noting that if these agro-industrial farms are
treated as industrialized operation, number of individual operations needing regu-
lations is less and compliance cost is placed on operations that are most capable of
passing those costs to consumer). Professor Houck cites to this same quote from
Ruhl and notes that legal distinctions between large and small municipalities al-
ready exist. Aftershock and Prelude, supra note 56, at 445-47 and accompanying text.
169. See Williams, supra note 3, at 29 (noting that best approach to regulation
is mix of strategies).
170. Id. at 71 (noting that lack of linkage makes it difficult to develop regula-
tory programs).
171. DEP [Florida Dept. of Envt'l Prot.] Nonpoint Source Management, avail-
able at http://www.dep.state.fl.us/water/nonpoint/pubs.htm (emphasizing educa-
tional nature of manuals).
172. E.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 40E-63.136; see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 40C-
44.055 (noting that agricultural operations requiring permit qualify for general
permit if operation has "Conservation Plan"). A "Conservation Plan" is "a docu-
ment which describes a system of management practices to control and reduce soil
erosion and sediment loss, and improve the quality of discharged water for a spe-
cific parcel of property, and which .. . includes and applies . . . the Best Manage-
ment Practices Selector." FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 40C-44.021 (4).
173. FLORIDA NONPOINT SOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM UPDATE 74 (Nov.
1999); see also, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 40C-44.041(1)(a) (1995) (requiring per-
mits in Apopka Basin for agricultural operations with surface water management
system with total pump capacity of greater than 10,000 gallons per minute); see
also, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 40C-44.041 (1) (b) (1995) (allowing water manage-
ment district to require permits of any agricultural operation on case-by-case basis
if operation causes or contributes to violation of state water quality standards).
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presented here. The law still requires a state agency 7 4 to provide
technical and financial assistance for implementation of BMPs. 175
This kind of agricultural subsidy still implicates fairness and effi-
ciency concerns. 76 Is it fair to impose the costs for agriculture's
pollution reductions on others? If answered affirmatively, does it
subvert the supposed devotion to "free market" economics to sup-
port agricultural operations that could not survive in the market if
forced to internalize the costs of dealing with their own pollution?
These questions are difficult and, in all fairness, can be rephrased
to imply contrary answers. For example: Should agricultural opera-
tions be forced out of business when the extra expense of environ-
mental protection prevents agricultural operations from effectively
competing with operations in countries with fewer environmental
restrictions?177
Florida's efforts to tackle agricultural NPS pollution have, in
some instances, put Florida in the lead on NPS pollution control by
requiring BMPs of agriculture in large areas. 178 Nevertheless, much
of the cost for water quality improvements has been externalized by
agriculture. While it may not be reasonable in light of past history
174. The Department of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs (DACS) is the
agency responsible.
175. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.4595 (3) (c) (2) (b). See generally Aftershock and Prel-
ude, supra note 56, at n.251-52 and accompanying text. "The state of Wisconsin is
in the final stages of adopting rules imposing mandatory controls on nonpoint
source runoff but require the state to provide 70% of the costs. The state of New
York is providing over $14 million to farmers for runoff abatement, and the city of
New York is kicking in another $10 million to protect its drinking water resources."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
176. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.461 (5) (a) (2002) (noting that Florida has
even, in some instances, decided that it is easier for state to buy land to take it out
of agricultural production than to try to control pollution created by it by other
means).
177. Assuming that increased environmental protection necessarily costs agri-
cultural operations more than it saves them may not always be correct. Just as
other industries have often noted savings after implementing measures designed
to further environmental goals, agriculture should consider the tremendous cost
involved in fertilizer application. Andrew Brengle, Proving the Value of Environmen-
tal Management Systems, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD Arr. 205, 210 (2002) (noting tenta-
tive links between financial and environmental performance). Up to 40% of
nitrogen and 60% of phosphorous applied to crops are not taken up by the crops.
FERTILE GROUND, supra note 11, at 7 (citing to National Research Council analysis
of nutrient use in United States). Since nitrogen and phosphorous cost farmers a
tremendous amount to buy and apply, the savings potential could be substantial.
Even if environmental protection could save agriculture money in some instances,
this does not help if farmers do not realize it since even a mistaken belief that
something would not make us all better off, still acts as a transaction cost that
prevent change. Calabresi, supra note 122, at 1211.
178. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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to suddenly heavily regulate farming,179 we must insist that farming
begin to internalize some of its own costs of pollution abatement.
Thus, generally-applicable performance requirements on agri-
culture should be implemented. These requirements could vary ac-
cording to a number of factors, including soil, slope, climate, and
crop,180 and could be met by designing a plan choosing from a vari-
ety of available BMPs. Doing so would not punish the best stewards,
as they would likely already be in compliance.181 To accomplish
this, however, would require new and direct regulatory authority
over NPSs such as agriculture.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Runoff from agriculture now constitutes one of our most seri-
ous water quality problems. The large contribution of agriculture
to water pollution stems in part from the different regulatory treat-
ment of agricultural NPSs compared to other sources of pollution
under federal law.182 Water quality trading presents many potential
benefits in dealing with agricultural NPS pollution; chief among
these is utilization of a market mechanism to focus pollution abate-
ment dollars on the least-cost pollution-abatement activities. CWA's
179. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Agriculture and the Environment: Three Myths, Three
Themes, Three Directions, 25 ENVTL. L. & POL'YJ. 101, 105 (2002) (noting that farm-
ers and consumers have relied on "benign neglect" of environmental law, and that
this makes it less reasonable to suddenly and completely impose command-and-
control regulation on industry). See also Rose, supra note 148 (noting that draco-
nian restrictions for environmental purposes may not be appropriate when long-
time usage and attitudes have encouraged substantial investment based on ac-
cepted practice).
180. See, e.g., Aftershock and Prelude, supra note 56, 443-91 and accompanying
text (citing to J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law,
27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 333-37 (2000)).
181. FERTILE GROUND, supra note 11, at 40 (noting no adverse effect on those
already in compliance).
182. Compare Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. S. Florida Water
Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that discharges from
pumping station are "point sources" which need NPDES permit under Clean
Water Act even if pump station itself adds no pollution to water being pumped),
rehearing en banc denied, 45 Fed. Appx. 880, 2002 WL 1424348 (11 th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 2638 (2003), with Fishermen Against the Destruction of the
Env't, Inc. v. Closter Farms, Inc., 300 F.3d 1294, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2002) (exempt-
ing polluted discharges from pumping station into Lake Okeechobee because all
water discharged was either covered by NPDES permit or fell under exemptions
for agricultural return flows or agricultural stormwater runoff), rehearing en banc
denied, 52 Fed. Appx. 489, 2002 WL 31415798 (11th Cir. 2002). See also Schultz &
Small, supra note 4, at 385; 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2000). The CWA may be able to
affect NPS pollution through the TMDL provisions in section 303(d) of the CWA.
See § 1313(d), supra. However, one must note that section 303(d) grants no direct
federal authority to regulate NPSs. See id.
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real goal, however, is clean water, not just economic efficiency to
achieve less dirty water at a lower cost.1 8 3 But even if least-cost pol-
lution abatement was the focus of CWA, trading will not save as
much money in practice as theory indicates.
First, while trading programs have resulted in water quality im-
provements, the improvements have seldom come from actual
trades)18 4 Rather, improvements in water quality in areas with pilot
trading programs seem to come more from the influx of time,
money, and concern for water quality in the area than actual trades.
Second, transaction costs offset much, if not all, the savings of-
fered by trading.18 5 Transaction costs seem poised to devour the
possible savings of trading programs due to complexities associated
with things such as trading ratios, modeling, legality, and
information.
Furthermore, trading under the current regulatory scheme, or
lack thereof for agricultural NPSs, represents a simple shifting of
costs for the externalization of agriculture's pollution costs. Effi-
ciency dictates that agriculture should internalize its own pollution
abatement costs. But one cannot expect agricultural interests to
readily accept changes in the policy of exempting agriculture from
the costs of pollution abatement if such changes cost money.186
While it could be argued that trading proposes to remedy inef-
ficiency by using market mechanisms to focus on the least-cost solu-
tions, even the theoretical cost savings offered by trading depend
largely on the enormous cost differentials in pollution abatement
between agriculture and PSs. These cost differences, however, re-
sult because the easiest and cheapest reductions by PSs have long
been requirements of the law, whereas agriculture's low marginal
cost for pollution reduction comes precisely from not being sub-
jected to similar requirements.
Furthermore, distributive concerns also arise from EPA's policy
that recommends establishing baselines for creation of trading
credits by looking to "the level of pollutant load associated with ex-
isting land uses and management practices that comply with appli-
cable state, local, or tribal regulation."18 7  This effectively
183. Blacklocke, supra note 63, at 225.
184. See supra note 61.
185. See EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6 (noting trading policies' transac-
tion costs can overcome any savings); see also supra Section V.E (discussing transac-
tion costs).
186. See, e.g., FERTILE GROUND, supra note 11, at 25-26 (explaining that agricul-
tural interests will want to keep agriculture exempt).
187. EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6.
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incorporates existing inequities and inefficiencies of current agri-
cultural pollution regulation into trading, thus rewarding agricul-
ture's battle to maintain its virtual immunity to pollution
regulation.
Even assuming baselines for trading were established by a mod-
eling program that presupposed agricultural BMPs to reduce NPS
pollution, one can expect that actual BMP implementation costs
will still be externalized to taxpayers 88 unless the states or federal
government subject agriculture to regulatory requirements to im-
plement BMPs.18 9
In the case of agriculture and industry, one would expect agri-
cultural interests to promote water quality trading since, as envi-
sioned by EPA's policy, trading addresses agricultural NPS
pollution without agriculture paying the bill. The agricultural
lobby has continued to strenuously fight regulation of agricultural
188. This would occur, as it does now, in the form of agricultural subsidies
and the CWA's § 319 program. For a description of the § 319 program attempting
to deal with NPS pollution, see FERTILE GROUND, supra note 11, at 72-78.
189. Some might assert that it does not make any difference if taxpayers di-
rectly subsidize agriculture's NPS pollution reduction or not since taxpayers will
eventually foot the bill anyway since the cost will be passed on to us as consumers
in higher food costs. This could even be argued to disproportionately harm the
poorest segments of society that spend a greater percentage of their budget on
food. This argument not only misses the point that a miniscule part of what we pay
for food goes to the farmers. See Brian Halweil, The Worldwatch Institute, Farming
in the Public Interest, in STATE OF THE WoRLD 2002, at 56 (2002) (noting that, in
1997, U.S. farms captured only seven percent of the money consumers spent on
food products). This argument also fails to consider the economic theory of inci-
dence analysis. Incidence analysis examines who pays for increased production
costs, and emphasizes that this varies according to the extent to which the product
produced can be replaced by another-elasticity-or the extent to which in-
creased cost will simply result in fewer sales of the product. Ultimately, incidence
analysis indicates that very seldom will one hundred percent of an increase in pro-
duction cost be borne by the consumer; rather, it is borne by a combination of the
consumer (in increased cost), the producer (in decreased profits on sales made),
and again by the producer (in lost sales). See generally JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAw
AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 18-20 (2d ed. 2000) (providing very accessible ex-
planation of this often-overlooked concept). While demand overall for food prod-
ucts may be very inelastic since food is a necessity (see Price Elasticity of Demand,
infra) and this would typically mean that increased production costs will be prima-
rily borne by the consumer (see HARRISON, supra), demand for domestic agricul-
tural goods may be more elastic depending on the substitutability of imports for
domestic goods. See Patrick L. Anderson et al., Mackinac Ctr. for Public Policy,
Price Elasticity of Demand (1997), at http://www.mackinac.org/article.asp?ID=1247
(noting that substitutability is factor in determining elasticity); HARRISON, supra.
Thus, if increased food production costs for farmers occur, almost none of that
cost would be passed on to consumers. The increased cost argument also fails to
account for the fact that many existing subsidy programs encourage environmen-
tally destructive behavior.
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NPS pollution'"0 and many now view water quality trading as an
alternative to direct regulation of agriculture. This approach, how-
ever, depends on ratcheting down existing regulations of PSs to
such low levels that the PSs, rather than fighting the stricter regula-
tion, find it easier to advocate trading for which the PSs pay the bill.
This makes trading a way to change who pays for agricultural NPS
reductions; instead of taxpayers directly paying (through inefficient
agricultural subsidies and polluted water), PSs will be forced to pay
the bill.
In addition to the potential hardships faced by farmers forced
to internalize pollution costs, such a change would also diminish
the cost differentials between agricultural NPS pollution abatement
and PS pollution abatement. This would undermine the feasibility
of trading in the short term as a trading scheme depends on large
differences in marginal costs for pollution abatement. Unfortu-
nately, if the feasibility of trading is lost, trading's potential bene-
fit-a market incentive for those capable of least-cost improvements
in water quality to actually do so-is also lost. The loss of feasibility
for trading, however, occurs because the same goal-getting the
least-cost pollution reducers to reduce-has been accomplished by
focused regulation.
Even assuming the questionable proposition that water quality
trading could reduce agricultural pollution at a lower overall cost
than other approaches, the question in the final analysis becomes
whether the possibility of spending less money overall on water pol-
lution reduction through trading is more valuable than equity con-
cerns about who pays for the reductions. If it is concluded that it is,
then a trading program needs to be carefully structured so that, at
minimum, it does not punish the best stewards of the land and re-
ward agriculture in general for agriculture's long struggle to re-
main exempt from environmental regulations.
A different market mechanism, which would be easier to im-
plement than trading and has lower transaction costs, is a tax on
fertilizers containing nitrogen and phosphorous. 191 This incorpo-
190. See Environmental Law of Farms, supra note 13, at 5 (noting that any farm-
ing proposal for comprehensive environmental regulation will be met with opposi-
tion); see also Williams, supra note 3, at 25 (pointing out reluctance of states to
impose direct controls because of political power of agricultural interests); Lessons
from the Clean Air Act, supra note 28, at 208 (noting that it often appears that, due to
political pressures and resistance, it can prove virtually impossible to actually sub-
ject NPS polluters to additional federal authority).
191. See Wallace E. Oates, Taxing Pollution: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, THE
RFF READER IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 63, 64 (Wallace E.
Oates ed., 1999).
[Vol. xv: p. I
36
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol15/iss1/1
WATER QuALiTY TRADING
rates the idea of efficiency by allowing those using fertilizers and
chemicals to determine the value of their activity without giving any
one party the "right" to pollute for free. 192 Since this does not di-
rectly address the importance of sedimentation as an agricultural
pollutant, 193 other mechanisms would also be necessary.
One such mechanism should be imposition of erosion per-
formance standards for agricultural operations. Performance stan-
dards could be set using factors similar to those identified in
trading ratios to focus on farms with the largest contribution to
water quality standards. Farmers could then select combinations of
established BMPs to comply with the focused performance stan-
dard. If it is decided that the financial cost to farmers would be so
high under such requirements as to force too many out of business,
subsidy programs that focus exclusively on BMPs implemented to
meet performance requirements could be maintained. Theoreti-
cally, this could be cheaper than using trading to have high-cost
abatement PSs pay low-cost abatement NPSs such as agriculture to
reduce pollutants. For an incentive or subsidy to give rise to volun-
tary adoption of water protection activities such as BMPs by agricul-
ture, the incentive must not only offset the cost of the BMPs, but
From this perspective, the basic cause of excessive environmental degra-
dation is the absence of an appropriate price for scarce environmental
resources. Once accepted, this proposition has a direct policy implica-
tion: the need for government to intervene and, in the absence of the
interplay of supply and demand, to impose an artificial price, a tax (or
effluent fee), on damaging waste emissions. It is easy to show in terms of
microeconomic analysis that if this tax is set equal to the value of the
damages from an additional unit of emissions, sources will have the
proper incentive for controlling their discharges of pollutants. Economic
analysis thus suggests the need for taxation of pollution to correct for a
serious "failure" in a competitive market system.
Id.
The economic rationale behind ... [pollution] taxes is that those who
cause pollution should bear costs. Such costs include both damages to
environment and administrative costs incurred by authorities that regu-
late polluters. To be economically efficient, environmental taxes should
reflect both of these costs.
U.S. EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 33; see also Aftershock and Prelude, supra note 56, at
Section III.B.3 (noting that one of European Union's environmental principles is
that polluter should pay). Because so much of the fertilizer applied does not get
taken up by plants and thus may become pollution, application of fertilizer assures
some level of pollution in most cases. See supra note 176.
192. A recent study by the World Resources Institute noted, however, that a
trading program would likely give greater pollution reduction for its cost than
would a pollution tax. See Suzie Greenhalgh & Amanda Sauer, World Resources
Institute, Awakening the Dead Zone: An Investment for Agriculture, Water Quality, and
Climate Change (2003), at http://pubs.wri.org/pubs-description.cfm?PubID=3803.
193. See generally EPA TRADING POLICY, supra note 6 (discussing how trading
does not address problem of sedimentation).
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must also have the promise of tangible benefit to those undertaking
the water protection activities. Under a voluntary scheme, the way
to do this is by the promise of increased profit. A regulatory
scheme requiring implementation of the same BMPs could be sup-
plemented by a subsidy covering only the cost of implementation.
This would leave agriculture no worse off for complying with the
regulation than agriculture was before the regulation and would
decrease the amount of money needed for the change. The diffi-
culty with this scheme is ensuring that the regulatory BMP require-
ments that will be subsidized are the most cost-effective ones
available. This concern can be addressed by setting overall per-
formance requirements that individual farmers can meet with their
choice of many different available BMPs.
Such a system would merge the control of the farmer over
which methods work best for the farmer's operation with the pub-
lic's interest in cleaner water and continued viability of farms. The
farmer's ability to choose, based on practical considerations, which
BMPs to use, would encourage implementation of the simplest,
most effective BMPs. Part of this strategy should also include tech-
nical assistance for small farms for BMP implementation regardless
of whether the farmer receives a subsidy for actual implementa-
tion.1 94 Unfortunately, subsidizing even the easiest, most cost-effec-
tive BMPs still rewards agriculture in general for having remained
free of regulation because the costs for BMPs would be borne by
the public instead of by agriculture. At least this approach is a
more honest and direct subsidy to agriculture than shifting the
costs to PSs under the guise of trading. Furthermore, this also al-
lows more time to study the difficulties of transaction costs and im-
plementation of trading.
Finally, in acknowledgment of the differences between truly
mammoth, "industrial" farms and "family" farms, Professor Ruhl's
suggestion of outright regulation of many aspects of industrial
farms should be followed. While people have long noted the diffi-
194. An analog for this is the EPA's effort to work with smaller industries and
businesses to facilitate their compliance with complex regulatory structures. See,
e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SMALL BUSINESS OMBUDSMAN, at
http://www.epa.gov/sbo/ (last modified Aug. 11, 2003) (including links to re-
sources such as "EPA Small Business Strategy 2003," "Environmental Assistance
Services for Small Businesses: A Resource Guide," "Opening Doors for America's
Small Businesses," and "A Resource Directory of Small Business Environmental As-
sistance Providers"). This is done because EPA recognizes the disadvantages that
small businesses feel they face in complying with regulations. See U.S. EPA, Unify-
ing EPA 's Small Business Activities: A Strategy to Meet the Needs of Small Businesses 1-2
(2003), at http://www.epa.gov/sbo/strategy2003.pdf.
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culty of defining a "family" farm, EPA also has a history of regulat-
ing according to the size and nature of other industries.
These changes would help "level the playing field" between
NPSs and PSs. Although "leveling the playing field" might tempo-
rarily sideline trading, trading will probably return to the field since
the game of restoring the chemical, physical, and biological integ-
rity of our Nation's waters seems far from over.
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